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STUDENT MATERIAL
Note

RELIEF FROM LONG-TERM COAL SALES
CONTRACTS THROUGH COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Long-term coal sales agreements have been the center of discussion in many
recent articles. Among the issues covered with regard to long-term contracts are
allocation of risk,' pricing provisions 2 and unforeseeable conditions that may arise
during the operation of such agreements.3 Behind these issues lies the more basic
question of who bears the loss when an unexpected condition occurs that adversely
affects only one party to the contract. Within the context of long-term coal sales
agreements, the seller has traditionally borne any loss due to conditions not provided for in the contract.' The Uniform Commercial Code, however, has recognized the unfairness of placing strict liability on the seller and has provided an
escape mechanism in the form of section 2-615, commonly known as the doctrine
of commercial impracticability.5
This Note explores the possibility of discharge for sellers in a long-term coal
sales contract through the doctrine of commercial impracticability. This is a narrow exploration which deals only with discharge due to severe economic loss occasioned by unforeseen circumstances. The question of whether discharge is warranted
under these circumstances has been squarely decided by only one court, the Missouri
Court of Appeals.6 Because this decision has limited application as precedent, the
issue largely remains open. Case analysis indicates however, that given the right
7
circumstances and a sympathetic court, the possibility of discharge does exist.
Before further discussion of the possibility of relief, a brief history of longterm coal sales agreements is necessary to provide insight into the problems facing
some sellers today. Following this, the development of the doctrine of commercial
impracticability by the courts will be discussed. Lastly, this Note will examine the

' See Carney & Metz, Risk Allocation in the Long-Term Coal Sales Agreement, I E. MIN. L.
INST. 9-1 (1980).
See Carney, Pricing Provisionsin Coal Contracts, 24 RocKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 197 (1978).
See Murray, Long-Term Supply Contracts: Foreseeing the Unforeseeable, 2 E. MIN. L. INsT.
2-1 (1981).
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir. 1976).
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978).
6 Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 865 (1979).
' See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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doctrine in the context of coal sales agreements, and will attempt to identify the
specific circumstances required for discharge.
II.

LONG-TERM CoAL SUPPLY AGREEMENTS

In the mid-sixties, the coal industry was fiercely competing with the oil producers for industrial fuel supply contracts.' Therefore, once finding a purchaser,
coal suppliers were more than willing to bind themselves to contracts for ten, twenty,
and sometimes thirty years. In this manner, the coal producer could assure himself
of a steady customer for long periods of time.
This competition among suppliers made the market for fuel a buyer's market,
that is, the buyers were in the better bargaining position of the two parties to the
contract. 9 As a result, great concessions were made to the purchasers with respect
to escalation clauses, escape clauses, and pricing provisions."0 Producers, however,
were not very concerned at this point because productivity was constantly increasing and there was no reason to believe that the trend would falter." The seller
therefore believed he would recoup any short-term profit losses due to contract
concessions through increased productivity. 2 The increased productivity would have
resulted in decreasing per-unit costs of production, which in turn would have resulted
in increased profit margins.' 3 This prediction by the producers would have been
correct had it not been for a number of conditions, both foreseen and unforeseen,
that occurred in the late sixties and throughout the seventies that astronomically
raised the cst of producing coal.
In the late sixties, after long periods of relative stability, problems with labor
arose."4 Although these problems contributed to the downward shift in productivity, they will not be discussed as contingencies because uncertainties with labor
have existed since industrialization began, and should therefore have been foreseen
by the producers. 5 In addition to labor unrest, the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, ' 6 rampant inflation caused by the oil embargo of 1973,1" and
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19771 represented costly conditions that resulted in further reductions in productivity and increasing costs of
production.'9
1 See Carney & Metz, supra note 1, at 9-4.
9 P. ECKSTEIN & W. SICHEL, BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 50 (1977).
Carney, supra note 2, at 202.
Carney & Metz, supra note 1, at 9-6.

'°

Id. at 9-5.
, ECKSTEIN & SICHEL, supra note 9, at 109.
'4 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON COAL, CoAL DATA BOOK 124 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as COAL
DATA BOOK].

" See D. BoK, A. Cox & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 9 (1981).
36 30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-960 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982)).
J. VERNON, MACROECONOmICS 258 (1980).
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)).
19 COAL DATA BOOK, supra note 14, at 124.
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If the producer had no or inadequate pass-through provisions in his sales contract, the entire burden of this increase in costs fell on him. Furthermore, such
standard escape provisions as force majeure and gross inequities clauses provided
little help. Under such clauses, the issue would first have to go through arbitration
to determine whether this particular condition, was included as a covered
contingency. 2" Then, if the seller was successful in claiming the condition as a force
majeure, the buyer could raise the prompt notice defense.' Finally, the question
remains whether force majeure requires that performance be impossible-rather
than merely impracticable-before relief will be granted.2 2 It is easy to see from
this scenario why a seller would seek relief from the courts.
III.

THE DOCTRINE OF COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY

The doctrine of commercial impracticability arises under section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which reads:
2-615 Excuse by Failure of
Presupposed Conditions
Except so far as seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by seller who complies
with paragaraphs (b) and (c) [referring to partial performance and notice to buyer]
is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has
bden made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. .. 23
Discharge by reason of commercial impracticability thus requires proof of three
elements.2 "4 First, a contingency must have occurred.2 1 Second, the risk of the unex26
pected occurrence must not have been allocated either by agreement or custom.
Finally, performance of the contract must be commercially impracticable."

20 Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 366 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1974).
2! Young, Construction andEnforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply Agreements-Coping with

Conditions Arisihg from Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events-Force Majeure and Gross Inequities
Clauses, 27A RocKY MTN. Mn'. L. INsT. 127, 141 (1981).
22 Id. at 142. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 706 F.2d 444,
452 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 698 (1984) ("[T]he nonperforming party's duty extends
to showing what action it took to perform regardless of the occurrence of the excuse.").
22

U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978).

' Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Roth
Steel Prod. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 149 (6th Cir. 1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (E.D. La. 1981); Florida Power & Light
Co., v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 451 (E.D. Va. 1981); Aluminum Co. of Am.
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 71 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
25 TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315.
26
27

Id.
Id.
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Section 2-615 is the codification of the common law doctrine of impossibility. 28
However, this newer doctrine was intended to be a more flexible form of relief.29
To accomplish this end, the statute is written in general terms. 3" In this manner,
the equitable considerations
of each individual factual situation may be weighed
3
in applying the doctrine. '
The adoption of this statutory defense was intended to reflect commercial
sensibleness.3 2 Judge Skelly Wright wrote in TransatlanticFinance Company v.
United States, "The doctrine represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by the courts
hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which communities'
interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms
be outweighed by
33
the commercial senselessness of requiring performance."
Despite the flexibility rationale behind commercial impracticability, the courts
have rarely granted relief under the doctrine. Judicial forums have continued to
construe it strictly. There are two basic reasons for the courts' hesitation to apply
the doctrine liberally. First, there is a great reluctance to upset the sanctity of a
contract. 3 The courts feel that there is a genuine need for the parties to be able
to rely on their bargains. Without this reliance by commercial parties, the rationale
behind contracting would be undermined. 3- Second, the courts do not want commercial impracticability to be misused. There is a very real fear that parties may
36
use the doctrine merely to escape bad deals or unprofitable business ventures.
Evidence of this type of abuse is apparent in a number of the cases that have
been denied relief. The next section of this Note deals with an analysis of many
of the unsuccessful attempts at utilizing commercial impracticability. This analysis
will help answer two questions. First, what standards do the courts require to
establish the elements of commercial impracticability. Second, have the courts been
unnecessarily strict in their application of the doctrine, or has the denial of relief
been more the result of weakly-based attempts to escape from unwise deals.
IV.

THE

COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE

A review of recent cases involving commercial impracticability demonstrates
that the judicial tribunals have thus far effectively denied relief under the doctrine.3 7

11

29
30

Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 450.
See Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315.
Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d at 726.

31 Id.
32

TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315.

3

Id.

31

See generally Murray, supra note 3, at 21.

35Id.

United States v. Buffalo Coal Mining Co., 345 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1965).
17See TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d 312; Roth Steel Prod., 705 F.2d 134; Louisiana Power
& Light, 517 F. Supp. 1319; Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. 440; Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp.
53; Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429.
31
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This has resulted from the demand for rigid compliance with the three elements
of commercial impracticability. The courts' task has further been facilitated by
narrowly drawn definitions with respect to those elements. The courts also limit
the types of contracts to which the doctrine may be applied. 8 However, there is
no indication that relief under the doctrine of commercial impracticability would
still be denied if the circumstances complied with all the courts' requirements.
Given the strictness of the courts' standards, most of the cases that have already
been decided under section 2-615 have failed to meet all or part of the test. 39 In
some instances, the claimant has failed to prove that the event involved was an
unforeseeable contingency. 0 Other cases have failed to show that the risk of the
contingency was not allocated by agreement or otherwise,"' or that the cost of performance was so high as to render it impracticable.42 These cases have helped to
define the requirements for relief under commercial impracticability.
When a party raises the section 2-615 issue, the entire burden of proof is placed
upon him to establish the three elements.4 3 It is not enough that the party allege
these elements; he must affirmatively prove each with substantially probative
evidence. 44
First, the claimant must show that a contingency has occurred.45 In other words,
there must be evidence that the condition making performance impossible was
unforeseeable. 46 The test for unforeseeability is an objective one.4 7 Therefore, the
party asserting the doctrine will be held to what a normal, prudent person in his
position should have foreseen. 4' For example, in United States v. Buffalo Mining
Company,49 the claimant was a mine operator who did not foresee that tunneling
would be so difficult as to ruin the entire mining project. The Ninth Circuit held,
however, that the risk was one that the average mining entreprenuer should have
foreseen.5 ' Thus, claimant was deemed to have assumed the risk and relief was
denied.'
When deciding the foreseeability issue, the courts often look at an industry's
special knowledge of affairs. Particularly, the examination centers on the time before
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 599 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
"

Murray, supra note 3, at 2-18.

40 Buffalo
"

Coal Mining Co., 345 F.2d 517.

TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d 312.

"2Louisiana Power & Light, 517 F. Supp. 1319.
41 Id. at 1324.
,4Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 450.
IId.at 454.
BLACK's LAW DxcrioNAaY 290 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of contingency).
, Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963, 971 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).

'

Id.
41 Buffalo
"

Coal Mining Co., 345 F.2d at 518.

50Id.
5 Id.
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the contract was made in order to determine whether the claimant knew of the
state of events which later lead to the occurrence of the alleged contingency. When
a party is deemed to have knowledge of the circumstances which lead to the contingency in question, the court reviews the claim of commercial impracticability
strictly."2 Thus, in Transatlantic Financing Corporation v. United States,
Mediterranean-based shippers were held to have knowledge of the problems in the
Suez area, and no discharge was permitted despite increased costs resulting from
the nationalization of the Suez Canal. 3 The claimant's knowledge seemingly raised
the suspicions of the court, and the District of Columbia Circuit surmised from
that knowledge that the shippers' willingness to proceed despite the volatile conditions in that area indicated an assumption of risk on their part. 4 In Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corporation, a federal district court followed the "special
industrial knowledge" rationale." The court found that Gulf, having vast operations in the Middle East, had knowledge of the unstable conditions and could
reasonably have foreseen the nationalization of oil fields and the ensuing oil
56
embargo.
Recently, another court agreed with the rationale of the EasternAir Lines court.
In Morin Building ProductsCompany v. Volk Construction, Inc., the court found
that the general contractor should have contemplated problems of delivery from
the subcontractors which greatly increased construction costs. 5 7 It may be surmised
that the court based its decision on the common knowledge that the construction
industry is fraught with problems of delay.
Not only must the contingency be unforeseeable, but it must also be beyond
the control of the party seeking discharge.5 8 The courts have uniformly denied relief
where the contingency could have been avoided by the party invoking the doctrine.
In Neal-CooperGrain Company v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, Texas Gulf sought
to be discharged from a contract under which it had agreed to supply Neal Cooper
with potash, because of Canadian price control regulation. s9 The Seventh Circuit
found that it was Texas Gulf's decision to switch from an American to a Canadian
mine. The company had knowledge of price regulation in Canada, but not of the
specific control which caused increased costs in the performance of its agreement
with Neal-Cooper." The court held that Texas Gulf could have avoided the increase by retaining operations in its American mine.

,2 Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 451.

Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 318.
" Id. at 319.

, Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 441.
56Id.

Morin Building Prod. Co. v. Volk Constr., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 82, 89 (D. Mont. 1980).
, Roth Steel Prod., 705 F.2d at 150.
" Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974).
60

Id. at 293-94.
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In addition, the courts will deny relief if the condition was actually created by
the party seeking discharge. The Sixth Circuit, in Roth Steel Products v. Sharon
Steel Corporation, held that a seller was not entitled to relief from supplying steel
products based on a claim of a raw materials shortage. 6' The court found that
the seller's inability to perform was due to an over-extension of its limited resources,
rather than an unexpected shortage of raw materials. 62 Also underlying this decision was the seller's obvious attempt to sell its product at the much higher market
price than the price reflected in the contract of sale.
The second element necessary to establish commercial impracticability is the
requirement that the risk of the unexpected occurrence must not have been allocated
either by agreement or custom. 63 Proof that the risk was allocated may be implied
or expressly stated in the agreement." Although the risk is generally placed on
the seller, risk allocation is determined by the totality of circumstances surrounding the contract."' The court will look at the comparative abilities of the parties
to make informed judgments as to the extent of the risk, each party's interest in
avoiding the risk, and the extent to which that interest was a factor in negotiating
66
the contract.
Where a party has contracted to perform without regard to the existence of
a contingency that was almost certain to occur, thereby rendering performance impracticable, the court will deny relief. The court has held that the assumption of
67
risk was a bargained-for provision.
In FloridaPower and Light v. WestinghouseElectric Corporation,Westinghouse
knew that the technology for reprocessing spent fuel from a nuclear power plant
was largely unavailable at the time the contract was signed. 6 Westinghouse was
also aware that the viability of its business of manufacturing nuclear power
generators depended on the signing of the contract. 69 Therefore, Westinghouse agreed
to reprocess the spent fuel when Florida Electric insisted upon that provision as
a prerequisite to the contract.7" The District Court found that the risk was therefore
allocated to Westinghouse as part of the bargained-for contract. 7
The final criterion for triggering the doctrine is that the performance of the

"

Roth Steel Prod., 705 F.2d at 150.

62 Id.

61 Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 455-56.
64 Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 316.
65 Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 456.
66 Id.
67 Id.
61 Id.
69
70

at 457.

Id. at 456-57.
Id.

71 Id.
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agreement be impracticable." In making this inquiry, the courts do not look to
see whether one particular contract term has become impracticable. Rather, the
examination is of the undertaking as a whole. 7 1 Impossibility of performance is
not required, but the courts do require that the cost of performance be excessive
and unreasonable. 7" Furthermore, it is not enough that the claimant be deprived
of anticipated profits; there must be evidence of loss, and the loss must be shown
to be severe.75
These strict requirements appear to have come about to discourage future
attempts to utilize commercial impracticability as a means to escape from bad
business ventures. Many of the cases indicate that parties who have not realized
profits due to changed circumstances have tried to capitalize on the commercial
impracticability defense, even though it was intended to protect against the more
serious commercial disaster. 6 Some parties have even attempted escape from a contract, not because of loss of profits on that contract, but to be free to take advantage of higher profits available because of changed market conditions." Attempts
have even been made by parent companies to claim loss due to unforeseen conditions, when those very circumstances have resulted in huge profits to their
subsidiaries.78 Faced with this type of manipulation, the courts have been compelled
to require greater proof of a more severe loss than was probably anticipated by
the framers of the doctrine.
The TransatlanticFinancingcase gave no defined limits of loss, but did hold
that a mere fourteen percent increase in cost did not warrant relief under the
doctrine." American Trading and Production v. Shell InternationalMarine, Ltd.
further "tightened the belt" by denying relief where a thirty-one percent increase
of the contract price was demonstrated." In dictum, the Second Circuit stated that
an increase of greater than fifty percent may be sufficient. 2 However, in Iowa
Electric Light and Power v. Atlas Corporation, a federal district court found that
an increase in the cost of performance of fifty-two percent, or any increase between fifty and fifty-eight percent, was not of sufficient magnitude to justify excuse of performance. 2
As a final note in this section, the courts will also deny relief when dealing
with certain types of contracts. Of particular interest, the courts have held that,

71 LouisianaPower & Light, 517 F. Supp. at 1323.
71 Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 453.
7, American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972).
11 LouisianaPower & Light, 517 F. Supp. at 1324.
71 Id.

at 1319.

See, e.g., Roth Steel Prod., 705 F.2d 134.
See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429.
7' TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 319.
,American Trading & Prod. Corp., 453 F.2d 939.
, Id. at 942-43.
,2 Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
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even if a commercial impracticability situation arises, a promisor must perform
where he has specifically warranted such performance. In other words, the defense
83
of commercial impracticability is unavailable for bargained-for warranty contracts.
V.

RELIEF FOR SELLERS IN LONG-TERM COAL SALES AGREEMENTS

The issue to be discussed in this section is whether commercial impracticability
will relieve a seller in a long-term coal sales agreement due to changed economic
conditions. In particular, the question is whether relief will be granted where the
cost of performance has increased because of the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act (FCMHSA),8 ' inflation induced by the oil embargo, and the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). s"
The first issue to be considered is whether these conditions constitute unforeseeable contingencies. FCMHSA was enacted in 1969 in order to provide governmental regulation of safety in the mining industry. Danger in mining had been
apparent from the industry's inception, but no mandatory regulation had been passed
until 1969. The catalyst for this legislation came in 1968 when an explosion at a
Farmington, West Virginia mine killed seventy-eight workers." A public outcry
for congressional action followed, and as a result, an extremely comprehensive and
expensive set of mandatory regulations was passed to replace the previous volun87
tary guidelines.
The long span of time between the beginning of the mining industry and the
eventual passage of safety legislation may be argued to indicate the unforeseeability
of the FCMHSA. Furthermore, it may be held that the FCMHSA was not something
that could have been anticipated at the time of the making of mid-sixties contracts.
It would have been impossible to supplement every contract with price adjustment
provisions in order to provide for an unknown regulation, the possible adverse
effects of which were also unknown. It would have been unfair to expect a buyer
to allow the inclusion of an open-ended pass through provision in case such a regulation turned out to be too expensive. Moreover, it would have been equally unfair
to expect a seller to agree to a provision that could have accounted for only a
fraction of the possible cost increases.
The Circuit Court in TransatlanticFinancingstated the issue of foreseeability
well: "Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the possibilities
of which they are aware. Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated
is probative but does not necessarily establish an allocation of the risk of the
contingency." 88 Although the court in Transatlantic Financing did find the
'
8

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 599 (3d Cir. 1977).
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C.

" 30 U.S.C.
J.

§§

MCATEER,

§§

801-962 (1982)).

1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979) (current version at 30 U.S.C.

§§

1201-1328 (1982)).

COAL M~mE HEALTH & SAFETY: THE CASE OF WEST VIRGINIA, at xiii (1973).

See supra note 85.

',

TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 318.
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foreseeability of political unrest to be an allocation of the risk to the seller, the
FCMHSA may be distinguished from those risks surrounding the much-troubled
Middle East. The many conflicts within the Suez region that lead to the closing
of the canal existed at the time of the contract.8" FCMHSA was not in existence
until 1969 and there had been no major legislation in this area until its passage.90
One factor, however, militates against a finding of unforeseeability. The argument has been made that the inclusion of a contingency in an exculpatory clause
in the agreement precludes a finding that the event was unforeseeable. 9 The view
of some courts is that the event had to be foreseeable at the time of contracting
in order for it to be included in the contract provision. This argument could pose
a major obstacle for sellers because most long-term coal sales agreements contain
force majeure or delay clauses which include, in general terms, acts of government.
However, this argument was effectively answered in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation.9 The Fifth Circuit concluded that when a party
has anticipated a general category of events, such as acts of government, but not
the specific contingency which results in increased costs, he should not be penalized
for his draftsmanship.9 3 Weighing all the arguments presented, there is a distinct
possibility for a finding of unforeseeability as to the enactment and terms of
FCMHSA.
A related question is whether the inflation caused by the oil embargo of 1973
was an unforeseeable event within the meaning of section 2-615. Of course, the
embargo shocked the Western world. Despite the astonishment at this occurrence,
certain parties have been held to have foreseen the possibility of the oil embargo. 94
In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corporation, the oil industry was held to
have had special knowledge of the volatile conditions in the Middle East due to
its extensive involvement in producing Arabian oil." Therefore, the court found
96
that an international oil producer should have foreseen the embargo.
Although the Eastern Air Lines decision was a fair imputation of special industrial knowledge to Gulf, it may be argued that imputing that knowledge to all
parties is manifestly unjust. However, in Missouri Public Service Company v.
Peabody Coal Company, a Missouri Court of Appeals did just that." The Missouri
court found that the embargo was a foreseeable event because some experts had
discussed the possibility of concerted action for years, 98 even though other reputable
" Id.

90 See

supra note 85.
11Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d at 991.
92 Id.
"1

Id. at 992.

1, Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 441-42.
9s Id.
96 Id.

91 Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d at 728.
98 Id.
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sources stated that the ability of the Arab world to unite for a successful embargo
was contrary to the expectations of the Western world."' Even in the wake of the
Missouri decision, the unforeseeability issue with respect to the oil embargo is still
an open one and, for the reasons noted above, may very well be decided in the
seller's favor.
A seller must also attempt to prove that the inflation which occurred as a result
of the embargo was unforeseeable. This should not be a difficult task. The embargo caused domestic inflation in the United States to rise from less than three
percent in 1973 to greater than twelve percent in 1975.0o The highest jump recorded in the previous ten years was a two percent increase between the years of
1963 and 1965."' Furthermore, the nature of the inflation was such that the government's fiscal policy was an ineffectual combatant. 0 2 Keynesian theories of governmental stabilization that had worked on inflation since the 1930s failed to remedy
0 3
the inflation caused by the embargo.'
Lastly, we must consider whether SMCRA may properly be regarded as a contingency under section 2-615. Many of the same arguments that were made regarding FCMHSA may also be raised here. First, although governmental regulation
of an industry is always a possibility, it is not always possible to make provision
for its occurrence. Second, since acts of government are included as force majeure
conditions, there is an implication that their occurrence should relieve a seller from
performance.
In sum, all three of the events discussed-FCMHSA, inflation, and SMCRAmay be demonstrated to have been unforeseen contingencies. This finding is,
however, only one of the three requirements of commercial impracticability. Even
so, a finding of unforeseeability lends support to the contention that a seller had
not assumed the risk of its occurrence, the second criterion under section 2-615.
If the occurrence is foreseeable then the risk is assumed by the parties and, if no
precaution is taken, the seller is left without recourse." 4 If, however, the event
is unforeseeable, then the risk is not assumed by either of the parties in the absence
of agreement." '
As was stated earlier, risk may be either expressly or impliedly allocated by
agreement."0 6 For example, in a warranty contract, a party assumes the risk of
the occurrence of any contingency by guaranteeing his performance. If seller has
provided no such guarantee, then the risk should not be allocated to him unless
the event was foreseeable.
" D. PERFTz, Tim MIDDLE EAST TODAY 128 (3d ed. 1978).
,00 J. VERNON, supra note 17, at 6.

10l Id.

101Id. at 288.
1"3 Id.
10" Murray, supra note 3, at 2-14.
"'5

Id.

"

TransatlanticFin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 316.
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The third and final element of commercial impracticability is a showing that
the contingency rendered performance impracticable.' 0 7 The case law indicates that
an increase in cost of performance caused by the events must be at least in the
range of sixty percent to relieve the seller.' 0 To be safe, however, the seller should
be able to prove an even greater increase in cost due to the contingencies.
For example, assume that at the time of contracting, the cost of producing
a ton of coal was three dollars and the contract price to buyer was four dollars.
The seller must be able to prove that not only has the unanticipated increase in
cost denied him his profit, he must also show that the cost increase has resulted
in severe losses. Therefore, he must establish that the cost has increased to five
dollars a ton (a sixty-seven percent increase) or more. Given the fact that most contracts contain certain price adjustment provisions,' 0 9 though these are woefully inadequate, the cost increase must also reflect the adjusted price to the buyer.
The seller must further show a causal nexus between the cost increases and
the contingencies." ' FCMHSA resulted in enormous costs to the producers, who
thereafter sought to sell their good on the market. The price of coal, which for
the most part is based upon cost of production,' rose from $31 per million BTUs
in 1969 to $92 per million BTUs in 1977, a two hundred percent increase." ' 2 In
per ton measurements, the price of coal, free of costs to buyer, rose from $8.01
per ton in 1968 to $8.15 per ton in 1969, to $9.70 per ton in 1970, and finally
to $20.50 per ton in 1977.'"
Not only did the Act result in increased costs directly, but it also affected costs
indirectly by decreasing productivity at the worksite. Since 1969, productivity in
the coal industry has decreased at an annual rate of 4.1%. " In underground operations where the impact of safety regulations has been hardest felt, productivity fell
nearly fifty percent between 1969 and 1977, from fifteen short tons per man-day
to eight tons per man-day.'" The effect of the FCMHSA was thus to cause severe
economic loss to producers and sellers in the coal industry.
Similarly, the fact that the inflation caused by the embargo was responsible
for cost increases must also be proved by the seller. As stated previously, inflation
rose from three percent to twelve percent in a span of two years. This represents
a one-hundred fifty percent increase annually. Because of its abnormality, this inflation could not be accomodated by the standard inflation adjustment clause, which
Id. at 315.
,0, See Iowa Elec., 467 F. Supp. at 140.
,09 Carney, supra note 2, at 218-19.
,10 Roth Steel Prod., 705 F.2d at 149.
10

CoALDATA BOOK, supra

Id.
"I Id. at 96.

note 14, at 99.

112

,,4 Id. at 124.
"I Id. at 125.
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was based upon the industrial commodities index."16 Unlike the consumer price
index, which includes the prices of imported goods and services"" and would
therefore automatically relect the oil-induced inflation, the industrial commodities
index is a much slower moving indicator."8 Because this index does not automatically
reflect the prices of imported goods, it could not accurately reflect inflation of
this type at its current rate. Therefore, the seller had to assume much of the burden
of that runaway inflation. As a result, cost of production rose even further.
Finally, the adverse effects of SMCRA must be demonstrated. In a report
prepared by Consolidation Coal Company in 1979, Consol maintained that the
Act would result in an increase of $2.785 billion in the cost of production over
the next eleven years."' 9 In figures that represent cost per ton, the study found
that compliance would cost $10.16 per ton.2 As a special note, producers in the
Appalachian coal fields would be hardest hit by the regulations, experiencing a
$14.53 per ton cost increase.'' This has been attributed to the steep slope nature
of the terrain in that region.' This study, though industry-biased in its perspective, clearly points to the severity of the effects of SMCRA. Indeed, all three contingencies have had drastic effects on the cost of production and, with respect to
FCMHSA and SMCRA, on coal productivity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The defense of commercial impracticability is a viable method of escape from
the harsh results of unforeseen economic circumstances. Furthermore, this method
is available to sellers in long-term coal sales agreements. The burden of proof,
however, is a heavy one which falls upon the seller who seeks to be relieved of
performance. The courts are suspicious of claims of commercial impracticability,
and carefully scrutinize all such claims. Therefore, the seller must be able to prove
each element of his defense with probative, uncontrovertible evidence. In view of
the severe conditions that have arisen in the past fifteen years and the arguments
attesting to their unforeseeable nature, a seller has a possible chance at relief from
unduly burdensome contracts. As was stated before, given the proper set of circumstances and a sympathetic court, discharge by reason of commercial impracticability can be a reality.
M. Rosalee Juba

116See Carney & Metz, supra note
",

1, at 9-6.

VERNON, supra note 17, at 45.
Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d at 723.

...CONSOLIDATED COAL CO., COST IMPACT ANALYSIS OF SELECT PROVISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING'S PERMANENT REGULATORY PROGRAM 1 (1979).
'

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 14.

'

FEDERAL SURFACE MINING REGULATIONS 4 (C. Joyce ed. 1980).
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